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Smith: Native American Use of Eagle Feathers Under the Religious Freedom

NATIVE AMERICAN USE OF EAGLE FEATHERS UNDER THE
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
Adair Martin Smith
I. INTRODUCTION

The bald eagle is one of the greatest national symbols in the United
States of America, and it has become synonymous with words like
freedom, justice, and liberty.
Accordingly, the United States
government has outlawed the possession of both bald and golden eagle
feathers in order to protect this treasured animal.' One exception to this
prohibition allows federally recognized Native American tribes to use
eagle feathers for a bona fide religious purpose. 2 Currently, there are
566 federally recognized tribes, comprising a total of 2 million members
with an additional 5.2 million persons of Native American heritage who3
belong in tribes not recognized by the federal government.
Consequently, there have been several lawsuits concerning the
constitutionality of federal legislation barring non-recognized tribes
from using eagle feathers for religious ceremonies.4
The most recent case to decide this issue was McAllen Grace
Brethren Church v. Salazar, in which appellants attended a Native

American religious ceremony where the participants wore eagle
feathers. 5 The individuals were found to be in violation of the Bald and
Golden Eagle Protection Act (Eagle Protection Act) for possessing eagle
feathers without a permit, which could not be issued because appellants
were members of a Native American tribe that is not federally
recognized.6 Appellants sued, claiming that the confiscation of eagle7
feathers violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
The Fifth Circuit ruled in the appellants favor, finding that the
regulations imposed by the Eagle Protection Act and the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act (MBTA) violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) and therefore, appellants could not be forbidden to possess

1. See 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1972). See also 54 Stat. 250 (1940).
2. 16 U.S.C. § 668a.
3. Tribal Directory, INDIAN
AFFAIRS,
U.S.
DEP'T
OF
THE
INTERIOR,
http://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/BIA/OIS/TribalGovemmentServices/TribalDirectory/ (last visited Feb.
18, 2015); McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465, 478 (5th Cir. 2014).
4. United States v. Vasquez-Ramos, 531 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Wilgus, 638
F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2011).
5. 764F.3dat468.
6. Id. at 468-69.
7. Id.
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eagle feathers. 8 The Fifth Circuit remanded this case to the district court
and created a circuit split with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, which have
both held that the Eagle Protection Act and MBTA do not violate RFRA
with respect to only allowing eagle feathers
to be used in religious
9
ceremonies of federally recognized tribes.
This Casenote examines the split circuit decisions in McAllen and two
other cases, United States v. Vasquez-Ramos and United States v.
Wilgus, on whether the prohibition of eagle feathers for non-federally
recognized Native American tribes violates RFRA. Part II of the
Casenote explains the background of the MBTA, Eagle Protection Act,
relevant portions of RFRA, and the new standard for deciding RFRA
cases, as discussed in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. Part II also
looks at how other circuits have decided the constitutionality of only
allowing federally recognized tribes the ability to possess eagle feathers
for religious purposes. Part III reviews the Fifth Circuit's decision in
McAllen, and Part IV analyzes the relevant case law and statutes.
Finally, Part V concludes that the Fifth Circuit correctly decided that the
MBTA and Eagle Protection Act's limit on non-federally recognized
tribes possession of eagle feathers does not pass the "least restrictive
means" test required by RFRA, and therefore, any regulation that
facially rejects non-federally recognized tribes access to eagle feathers
for religious use is unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause.
II.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RELATED CASE LAW

A. FederalRegulations ProtectingMigratoryBirds
At the beginning of the twentieth century, fueled by a rapidly
urbanizing United States, the slaughtering and exploitation of game and
non-game birds was both widespread and unchecked.' 0 This led to
concern regarding the extinction of migratory birds and compelled
conservationists to lobby for the enactment of international legislation to
protect migratory species." In response, the United States and Great
Britain enacted the Migratory Bird Treaty Act in 1916 in order to create
a convention that would protect the migratory bird population from
extinction. 2 This treaty is a reflection of the United States' commitment
to prohibit the pursuit, hunting, capturing, killing, or selling of migratory
8. Id. at 480.
9. Id.
10. Andrew G. Ogden, Dying for a Solution: Incidental Taking Under the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, 38 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 5 (2013).

11. Id. at 5-6.
12. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2004).
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birds native to the United States and its territories. 13 The treaty applies
to both live and dead birds and grants full protection to any part of a
migratory bird, including its nests, eggs, and feathers. 14 Currently, there
are over 800 bird species protected by the MBTA, and the treaty has
expanded to create conventions with Canada, Mexico, Japan, and Russia
to protect birds that migrate between these countries and the United
States. 15
One exception to the MBTA is federal regulation 50 C.F.R. § 22.22,
which is more commonly known as the eagle feather law. 16 This law
allows the U.S. Secretary for the Interior to issue permits allowing for
"the taking, possession, and transportation ... of lawfully acquired bald
eagles or golden eagles, or their parts, nests, or eggs for Native
American religious use.' 17 In determining whether a Native American
tribe may obtain a permit, the government requires that the Native
American tribe is federally recognized and that the eagle feather will
A tribe is
be used in "bona fide tribal religious ceremonies."'
considered federally recognized when it meets the following criteria:
(a) The petitioner has been identified as an American
Indian entity on a substantially continuous basis since
1900 . . . (b) a predominant portion of the petitioning
group comprises a distinct community and has existed as
a community from historical times until the present ...
(c) the petitioner has maintained political influence or
authority over its members as an autonomous entity from
historical times until the present . . . (d) a copy of the
group's present governing document including its
membership criteria ... (e) the petitioner's membership
consists of individuals who descend from a historical
Indian tribe or from historical Indian tribes which
combined and functioned as a single autonomous
political entity . . . (f) membership of the petitioning
group is composed principally of persons who are not
members of any acknowledged North American Indian
tribe ... and (g) neither the petitioner nor its members
are the subject of congressional legislation that has
expressly terminated or forbidden the Federal

13. Id. § 703 (a)-(b)(1).
14. Id. § 703(a).

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (2013).
Id. § 22.22.
Id.
Id. § 22.22(a)(5).
Id. § 22.22(c)(2).
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In 1940, the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act was passed in
order to specifically protect the bald eagle from extinction, since it is "a
symbol of the American ideals of freedom., 21 The Eagle Protection Act
prohibits the taking, possession, selling, purchase, transport, export, or
import of bald eagles, dead or alive, or any part, nest, or egg thereof of
the eagles, except as permitted by the Secretary of the Interior.22 In
1962, it was expanded to include the golden eagle in order to protect the
bald eagle, because the bald eagle is often killed after it is mistaken for
the golden eagle.23 This expansion also allowed the U.S. Secretary of
the Interior to authorize the taking of eagles or eagle parts for the
"scientific or exhibition purposes of public museums, scientific
societies, and zoological parks, or for the religious purposes of Indian
tribes," provided that the grant of the permit is compatible with the
preservation of bald and golden eagles.24
Congress and the Department of the Interior created a permitting
system and parts repository that regulates and distributes parts of eagles
in a manner compatible with the goals of the MBTA and Eagle
Protection Act. 25 Permits authorizing the possession of whole and parts
of eagles can be issued for "religious purposes of Indian tribes,"2 but
only members of federally recognized tribes may apply for and receive
permits.27 Once a Native American receives a permit from the
Secretary, the permit is forwarded to the National Eagle Repository in
Colorado (Repository).28 The Repository receives dead eagle parts and
distributes them to qualified permit applicants on a first-come, firstserve basis. 29 The Repository has an estimated waiting period of two
years for a whole bird and six months to fill an order for loose eagle
feathers.3 °

20. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (2015).
21. McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465, 469 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing 54
Stat. 250 (1940)).
22. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (1972).
23. McAllen, 764 F.3d. at 469, 473 (citing 76 Stat. 1246 (1962)).
24. 16 U.S.C. § 668a.
25. United States v. Vasquez-Ramos, 531 F.3d 987, 989 (9th Cir. 2008).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 668a.
27. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22.
28. McAllen, 764 F.3d at 470.
29. Id.
30. Ordering Eagle Parts and Feathersfrom the National Eagle Repository, FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.fws.gov/eaglerepository/FAQs/Eagle%20Q&A.pdf
(last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
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B. Religious Freedom RestorationAct
President Bill Clinton signed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
into law in 1993 as a congressional repudiation of the Supreme Court's
decision in Employment Division v. Smith.3' In Smith, the Court held
"that the Free Exercise Clause did not require the state of Oregon to
grant an exemption from its criminal drug laws for the religiously
inspired use of peyote by two members of the Native American
Church., 32
The Court based this decision on the idea that the
"compelling government interest" test, i.e. strict scrutiny, normally used
in religious matters does not apply to free exercise challenges dealing
with a "neutral, facially nondiscriminatory law[] of general
applicability." 33 Under strict scrutiny, the government must have a
compelling governmental interest in creating legislation that affects
religious matters and regulations must be narrowly tailored to the law to
achieve that interest. 34 The ruling in Smith lowered the level of scrutiny
applied to the free exercise of religion to rational basis scrutiny, which
essentially demolished three decades of precedent applying the strict
scrutiny test to free exercise claims and "created
a climate in which the
35
free exercise of religion [was] jeopardized.'"
In response to Smith, Congress passed RFRA to restore the
compelling governmental interest test. 36 The Act provided that:
(a) In general. Government shall not substantially burden
a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability, except as provided
in subsection (b).
(b) Exception. Government may substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means
of furthering that
37
compelling governmental interest.
Therefore, under RFRA, an individual must prove that his or her
religious exercise is substantially burdened by the regulation at issue. If
he does, the government may save the regulation by establishing that it:
31. Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Disposing of the Red Herrings: A Defense of the Religious

Freedom Restoration Act, 69 S.CAL. L. REV. 589, 592 (1996).
32. Id. at 601 (citing Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
33. Id (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 888).
34. Id.at 608.
35. Id.at 602-03.
36. Robin-Vergeer, supra note 31, at 606.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1993).
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(1) furthers a compelling government interest; and (2) is the least
means of accomplishing that compelling government
restrictive
38
interest.
Since the passage of RFRA, there have been two major Supreme
Court decisions analyzing the Act. First, the Court held in City of
Boerne v. Flores that RFRA is an exercise of Congress's power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and, accordingly, it is not applicable
39
to states, but can be constitutionally applied to the federal government.
Therefore, RFRA effectively provides a statutory claim to individuals
whose religious exercise is burdened by the federal government. 40 The
second, and most recent, Supreme Court decision revisiting RFRA was
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
In 2012, the large crafts store Hobby Lobby sued the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) pursuant to HHS regulations
promulgated under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA).4 1 The ACA requires employers with fifty or more full-time
employees to offer group health insurance coverage.4 2 This insurance
mandate includes providing "preventative care and screenings" for
women, which consists of "approved contraceptive methods,
sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling" that
could stop the development of an already fertilized egg. 43 While the
HHS offers an exemption from the so-called "contraception mandate"
for religious employers, it provides no exemption for profit-seeking
corporations with religious principles.44
Hobby Lobby is owned and operated by the Green family, active
practitioners of the Christian faith. Hobby Lobby has 500 stores, more
46
than 13,000 employees, and is organized as a for-profit corporation.
Despite its large size, Hobby Lobby remains under complete control of
the Green family and the corporate statement of purpose commits the
Greens to "[h]onoring the Lord in all [they] do by operating the
company in a manner consistent with Biblical principles. 47 The Greens
believe that "life begins at conception and that it would violate their
religious beliefs to facilitate access to contraceptive drugs or devices

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
Id.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2763.
Id. at 2765-66.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765.
Id. at 2766.
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that operate after that point. ' 4 8 Under this framework, the Greens and
Hobby Lobby sued HHS, challenging the contraceptive mandate under
RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause. 49 Hobby Lobby argued that the
contraceptive mandate burdened its exercise of religion by forcing it to
choose between either compromising its religious beliefs or paying a
hefty fine. 50 The Court concluded that the Greens could bring suit,
because RFRA "included corporations within [its] definition of persons"
and a "corporation is simply a51form of organization used by human
beings to achieve desired ends."
Since RFRA applies to corporations, the Court next looked at whether
the HHS contraceptive mandate substantially burdened the exercise of
religion. 52 The Court found that because the Green family had a sincere
religious belief that life begins at conception, the HIHIS mandate
effectively required that the Greens engage in conduct that violated their
religious beliefs or else suffer severe economic consequences amounting
to $1.3 million per day. 53 While Hobby Lobby could incur lesser
penalties by refusing to provide health insurance altogether, this would
also disadvantage the corporation when trying to hire talented
employees who value benefits like health insurance. 54 These added
costs to Hobby Lobby under the mandate clearly were a substantial
burden on the exercise of religion, so the Court then applied strict
scrutiny and analyzed whether the mandate "(1) [was] in furtherance of
a compelling governmental interest; and (2) [was] the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest., 55 The
Court found that the mandate did serve a compelling governmental
interest of ensuring that all women have access to FDA-approved
contraceptives; however, the "exceptionally demanding" least restrictive
means standard was not satisfied.56 The Court found that HHS had
already established exceptions for nonprofit organizations with religious
57
objections, a framework workable for corporations like Hobby Lobby.
Therefore, because there was a more viable accommodation available,
the HHS contraceptive mandate was not the least restrictive means of
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. Hobby Lobby reported that it would pay close to $475 million more in taxes every year
for refusing to provide coverage for contraceptives, or $26 million annually if it dropped healthinsurance benefits for all employees.
51. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2767.
52. Id. at 2775.
53. Id. at 2775.
54. Id. at 2776-77.
55. Id. at 2779 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-I(b) (1993)).
56. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780.
57. Id. at 2782.
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furthering the government's compelling interest of promoting women's
health.58 Consequently, failure to satisfy the least restrictive means test
resulted in the mandate being held unconstitutional.59
Hobby Lobby is a paramount decision because of how it changed
RFRA jurisprudence. It was the Supreme Court's first application of
RFRA to a federal law and was ground-breaking because "never before
. . . ha[d] the Court exempted a private, for-profit business from the

obligation to obey a generally applicable law." 60 Applying RFRA to
for-profit businesses, which constitute about ninety percent of
employers in the United States, greatly "expand[ed] the universe of
potential religious claimants and affected employees." 61 Furthermore,
the decision significantly expanded the strict scrutiny test. 62 Before
Hobby Lobby, one study reports that between 1980 and 1990, federal
appellate courts rejected eighty-seven percent of free exercise exemption
Applying religious exercise to for-profit corporations
claims. 63
demonstrates that "the RFRA strict scrutiny deployed in Hobby Lobby is
clearly not the deferential version of strict scrutiny that inhabits the pre[Hobby Lobby] free exercise cases. 64 Indeed, "scrutiny is now truly
'strict': the government is required to prove that important federal laws
providing critical benefits and protections . . . must satisfy a rigorous
65

constitutional test whenever they are applied to objecting believers."
This demonstrates how the Court has converted RFRA "from the

statutory restoration of an evenhanded balancing test into a doctrinal
revolution that has vested in federal judges the authority to craft a
wholly new and demanding religious exemption jurisprudence." 66 In
short, Hobby Lobby greatly "expanded the strength and reach of RFRA,

by enabling religious exemptions on the basis of alternatives that are
practically unavailable to implement even compelling government

judicial scrutiny of
interests, and by requiring genuinely strict
67
religiously burdensome government actions.,

58. See id.

59. Id. at 2785.
60. Gregory P. Magarian, Hobby Lobby in Constitutional Waters:
Anchor, 67 VAND. L. REv. EN BANc 67, 68 (2014).

Two Life Rings and an

61. Frederick Mark Gedicks, One Cheerfor Hobby Lobby: ImprobableAlternatives, Truly Strict
Scrutiny, and Third-PartyEmployee Burdens, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 153, 160 (2015).
62. See id. at 164, 166 ("But if RFRA's strict scrutiny test was so hard to satisfy in the case of
the Mandate, why should it be so easy to satisfy in every other case the Justices could imagine?").

63. Id. at 165.
64. Id. at 166
65. Id. at 167.
66. Gedicks, supra note 61, at 168.

67. Id. at 176.
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C. Possession of Eagle Feathersunder RFRA
1. Ninth Circuit
In United States v. Vasquez-Ramos, the Ninth Circuit held that the
MBTA's permit requirements and Eagle Protection Act did not violate
RFRA because these regulations were the least restrictive means of
achieving the compelling government interest of protecting the bald
eagle population.6 8 Here, law enforcement officers, investigating the
killing of bald eagles in captivity at the Santa Barbara Zoo, obtained
search warrants and found eagle parts and feathers at the defendants'
residence. 69 The defendants claimed to have received the feathers
during Native American religious ceremonies. 70 They could not obtain
permits to legally possess the feathers because they were not members
of a federally recognized Native American tribe. 7 1 Defendants were
charged with violating the MBTA and Eagle Protection Act for illegally
possessing feathers and talons of bald and golden eagles without a
permit. 72 The defendants moved to dismiss, claiming the federal law
The
prohibiting their possession of eagle feathers violated RFRA.7
defendant's argued that preserving the eagle population was no longer a
"compelling governmental interest" because the bald eagle was taken
off the Endangered Species List in 2007, demonstrating that the bald
eagle population had sufficiently recovered. 74 The court rejected this
argument, finding that Congress passed the Eagle Protection Act
recognizing that "the bald eagle is [not] a mere bird of biological interest
but a symbol of the American ideals of freedom," and therefore, the
government has a continued interest in preserving the species, regardless
of their endangered status.75
The court found that while the permit requirement to possess eagle
feathers substantially burdened the defendants' religious beliefs, the
permit requirement also passed the RFRA analysis. 76 In reaching this
decision, the Ninth Circuit primarily relied on its decision in United

68. 531 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 2008).
69. United States v. Vasquez-Ramos, 522 F.3d 914, 916 (9th Cir. 2008).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72.

Vasquez-Ramos, 531 F.3d at 989.

73. Id.
74. Id. at 991.

75. Id. (quoting 54 Stat. 250 (1940)). See also United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1128
(10th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (finding "[tihe bald eagle would remain our national symbol whether there
were 100 eagles or 100,000 eagles. The government's interest in preserving the species remains
compelling in either situation.").
76. Vasquez-Ramos, 531 F.3d at 991.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

9

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 10

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 84

States v. Antoine, holding that "because there is a fixed supply of eagles
that exceeds demand from religious adherents, the burden on religion is
inescapable., 77 Therefore, even if the government created an exemption
to the permit requirements for all Native American tribes, such an
exemption would still be burdensome to members of federally
recognized tribes in the exercise of their religious practice, because there
would be a more limited supply of eagle feathers. 78 In light of this, any
policy would cause a burden on the exercise of religion, which made the
permit requirement "least restrictive"
while still protecting the bald
79
symbol.
national
America's
as
eagle
2. Tenth Circuit
Three years after Vasquez, the Tenth Circuit considered the same
issue in United States v. Wilgus, and found that the Eagle Protection Act
was the least restrictive means of serving the government's interest in
protecting the bald eagle. 80 In this case, Defendant Samuel Ray Wilgus
was arrested for possessing 141 bald and golden eagle feathers in
violation of the Eagle Protection Act.8 1 Wilgus was a follower of a
Native American religion, but not a member of a federally recognized
tribe, so he was unable to obtain eagle feathers legally. 82 Therefore, he
sued under RFRA, arguing that the government's prohibition of eagle
feathers on non-recognized
tribes substantially burdened his right to
83
practice his religion.
The court found that the Eagle Protection Act advanced two
compelling governmental interests: (1) protection of bald and golden
84
eagles; and (2) preservation of Native American culture and religion.
While the first interest was straightforward and clearly compelling, the
second interest was a bit more complex. 85 Ultimately, the court found
that the second interest was also compelling for several reasons,
including the "government's historical obligation to respect86 Native
American sovereignty and to protect Native American culture."
The Tenth Circuit next analyzed whether the Eagle Protection Act
was the least restrictive means under strict scrutiny and refuted the
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 992.
Id.
Id.
638 F.3d 1274, 1296 (10th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1277.

82. Id.

83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id. at 1285.
Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1285.
Id. at 1286.
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alternative schemes offered by the challenger. 87 The defendant offered
two alternative means that were less restrictive than the current
regulation. 88 The first was opening the Repository to all sincere
practitioners of Native American religion, and the second was to allow
tribal members who lawfully possess eagle feathers to give the eagle
feathers and parts as gifts to non-tribal members who practice a Native
American religion.89
The court held that the current regulation allowing only federally
recognized Native American tribes to possess eagle feathers was the
least restrictive means. 90 First, the majority found that the removal of
the eagle from the endangered species list did not necessarily translate
into an equivalent increase in the number of eagle parts available for the
Repository. 9' Second, the court found that the demand for eagle feathers
and parts by tribal members for religious use already exceeded the
supply available through the Repository. 92 If the government expanded
its regulations to include all Native American tribes, this could
dramatically impact members of federally recognized tribes who already
face long wait times for eagle parts. 3 Therefore, the defendant's
alternative means would harm the very population that the Eagle
Protection Act was designed to help.9 4
Third, the defendant's
suggestion would cause greater enforcement problems than the current
regulation. 95 Currently, if a Fish and Wildlife Services (FWS) agent
catches an individual in possession of eagle feathers, the agent simply
needs to determine if that individual is a member of a federally
recognized tribe to determine if any laws have been violated. 96 Under
the proposed regulatory scheme, an FWS agent must determine if an
individual is a sincere follower of a Native American religion, forcing
the agent to decide if the individual is being truthful or simply using
religion as a smokescreen to sell eagle parts on the black market. 97 In
comparison, the current regulation protecting only members of federally
recognized tribes ensures "that those tribes, which share a unique and
constitutionally-protected relationship with the federal government, will
87. Id. at 1288.
88. Id. at 1290.
89. Id.
90. Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1295.
91. Id. at 1291.
92. Id. In 2004, the Repository received 1,822 requests for eagles and eagle parts, but only
received 1,647 eagles that same year. See id. at 1282.
93. Id. at 1293.
94. Id.
95. Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1293.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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receive as98much of a very scarce resource (eagle feathers and parts) as
possible."
III. FIFTH CIRCUIT RULING IN
MCALLEN GRACE BRETHREN CHURCH V. SALAZAR
In McAllen, appellants received eagle feathers at a Native American

religious ceremony known as a powwow. 99 An FWS agent in
attendance at the powwow issued a notice of violation under the Eagle
Protection Act for possession of eagle feathers without a permit and
seized the feathers. 100 One of the appellants, Robert Soto, petitioned for
the return of his eagle feathers, but this request was denied because Soto
was not a member of a federally recognized tribe. 10 1 Appellants sued
the Department of Interior, arguing that the confiscation of the 1 eagle
02
feathers violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.'
All parties agreed that the Eagle Protection Act substantially
burdened App ellants' religious beliefs and Soto's sincerity in practicing
his religion.
The court found that "RFRA required the government to
explain how applying the statutory burden to the person whose sincere
exercise of religion is being seriously impaired furthers the compelling
governmental interests" and that "the interests need to be closely
tailored to the law."'10 4 As stated earlier, this traditional RFRA standard
was expanded in Hobby Lobby, in which the Supreme Court found that
"[w]here a regulation already provides an exception from the law for a
particular group, the government will have a higher burden in showing
that the law, as applied, furthers the compelling interest."' 0 5 Against
this backdrop, the Fifth Circuit considered the following compelling
interests: (1) protection of bald and golden eagles; and (2) fulfilling the
government's "unique responsibility" to federally recognized tribes.106
The Fifth Circuit ruled that the Appellee failed to demonstrate how its
regulatory scheme was the "least restrictive means" and remanded the
case for further proceedings in the district court. 10 7 Although it
ultimately disagreed with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, the Fifth Circuit
did conclude that protecting bald and golden eagles was a compelling
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.at 1295.
McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 2014).
Id.
Id. at 469.
Id.
Id.at 472.
McAllen, 764 F.3d at 472.
Id.
Id.at 473.
Id.at 480.
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interest regardless of whether the eagle is endangered because they are
an important national symbol. 10 8 The court also found that the
government's interest in protecting the country's relationship with
federally recognized tribes was compelling considering the United
States long history with Native American tribes. 0 9 For example, "[t]he
Supreme Court has long held that Congress's constitutional authority to
'regulate Commerce . . . with Indian Tribes includes an obligation to

protect the interests of federally recognized tribes." 110 However, the
Fifth Circuit parted with the Tenth Circuit in finding that the
government's response to protecting Native American tribes has not
been uniform and Congress has never defined "Native American tribes"
or "Indian tribes" as only including federally recognized tribes."'
Consequently, the court did not find that "Congress intended to protect
only federally recognized tribe members' religious rights." ' 1 2 In Soto's
case, he was a member of the Lipan Apache Tribe that, while not
federally recognized, has existed for 300 years and possesses a
"government to government" relationship with Texas and the United
States.' 13 The United States government failed to present any evidence
that an individual like Soto-someone whose religious beliefs are
undoubtedly sincere and whose tribe has a long-standing relationship
with both the state and federal government-would cause harm to the
relationship between Native American tribes
and the government if he
4
feathers."l
eagle
possess
to
were allowed
The Fifth Circuit next looked closer at the "least restrictive means"
test in relation to the government's interest in protecting eagles. The
court found that the "least restrictive means" test was a "heavy burden"
and an "exceptionally demanding test" to meet. 115 The Fifth Circuit
refuted all the Appellee's arguments, finding that: (1) no evidence
supported the assertion that expanding the permitting process would
cause an increase in poaching, especially since an eagle does not have to
die in order to obtain feathers; (2) evidence suggested that expanding the
permitting process would not burden FWS agents, because these agents
already have to rely on anecdotal information when interviewing Native
Americans who possess feathers; (3) while it was possible that the
current permitting system has kept the black market smaller, it is equally
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 473.
McAllen, 764 F.3d at 473.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
McAllen, 764 F.3d at 474.
Id. at475.
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possible that the black market exists solely because Native Americans
who are not in federally recognized tribes cannot otherwise obtain eagle
feathers; and (4) there was no specific evidence showing how permitting
individuals whose sincerity is not questioned to acquire permits would
jeopardize the Appellee's compelling interests.11 6
Because of this, the Fifth Circuit found that the Department of
Interior had not demonstrated that the current regulatory framework was
the least restrictive means of achieving its goals and remanded the case
to the district court to consider "the authorities cited in light of the
Supreme Court's recent holding in Hobby Lobby and its exacting
standard."' 17 The Fifth Circuit distinguished its opinion from the Ninth
and Tenth Circuit opinions because it was conducting the RFRA
analysis with the new standard, as promulgated
in Hobby Lobby, while
8
the other Circuits relied on past precedent."
IV. DiscusSION: THE RECENT HOBBYLOBBY DECISION EXPANDED RFRA
So THAT THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S REASONING IN MCALLEN
IS CONTROLLING

A. Eagle FeatherClaims Under RFRA Post-Hobby Lobby
The Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby expanded RFRA so
the traditional, narrower free exercise standard used by the Ninth and
Tenth Circuits is no longer controlling precedent. Instead, the Fifth
Circuit's reasoning in McAllen is more in line with the Hobby Lobby
analysis, which suggests that if there is an alternative way to achieve a
compelling governmental interest, this constitutes a basis for failure to
satisfy the least restrictive means test. 119 Hobby Lobby, in essence,
suggests that it is extremely difficult for the government to satisfy strict
scrutiny in most cases involving governmental laws or benefits if the
regulation at issue interferes with an individual's right to religious
exercise. 120 When examining the MIBTA and Eagle Protection Act
under this new RFRA framework, provisions that limit the availability
of permits to only federally recognized tribes fail to survive this new
strict scrutiny standard.
All three circuits are in agreement that the current requirements to
obtain a permit to possess eagle feathers substantially burden an
individual's religious beliefs because there is only a fixed supply of
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 476-78.
Id. at478.
Id. at479.
See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
See id.
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feathers far exceeding demand. 121 Since the Native American tribes
have proven that the MBTA and Eagle Protection Act substantially
interfere with their right to free exercise, the burden shifts to the
defendant to demonstrate that the current eagle protection legislation is
the least restrictive
means of achieving this compelling governmental
122
interest.
When analyzing the MBTA and Eagle Protection Act under strict
scrutiny, there are three compelling governmental interests: (1) to
protect bald and golden eagles, (2) to preserve Native American culture
and religion, and (3) to protect the United States' relationship with
Native American tribes.
Protecting bald and golden eagles is a
compelling interest because eagles previously have been endangered and
have a history of needing protection from poachers. Also, eagles are
symbolic creatures that represent the United States, giving them an
elevated status deemed worthy of protection. Next, protection of Native
American culture, religion, and relations are compelling interests
because of the tortured history the United States shares with the Native
Americans. Early American settlers drove Native Americans out of
their homes and urbanized their land, eventually giving rise to the Indian
Wars. 12 3 Then, in the 1830s, President Jackson signed the Indian
Removal Act, a policy relocating Native Americans from their
homelands in the southern states to the west in order to open Native
American lands for non-native settlements, resulting in the Trail of
Tears. 124 Even today, the Native American culture disproportionately
suffers from issues of racism, unemployment, drug addiction,
alcoholism, and gangs, which many scholars trace back to their
exploitation by the American government. 125
In light of this
mistreatment of the Native American people by the United States
government, there is clearly a compelling interest to preserve a
congenial relationship with the Native Americans, as well as to celebrate
and empower the group to practice its culture and religion.
Since there is a clear, compelling governmental interest in regards to
the MBTA and Eagle Protection Act, courts must next consider whether
the federal legislation at issue is the least restrictive means of achieving
121. United States v. Vasquez-Ramos, 531 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1295 (10th Cir. 2011).

122. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1993).
123. Trail of Tears, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/topics/native-american-history/trail-

of-tears (last visited Apr. 18, 2015).
124. Id.
125. Sara Horwitz, The hard lives-and high suicide rate--of Native American children on

reservations, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2014) https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/thehard-lives--and-high-suicide-rate--of-native-american-children/2014/03/09/6ead9b2-9f03-1 1e3-bgd894577ff66b28_story.html.
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these compelling governmental interests. 126 This is a hard burden to
meet in light of Hobby Lobby, because if there is any alternative to the
statute, the federal legislation fails strict scrutiny. Here, the Tenth
Circuit offered two viable alternatives to the IBTA and Eagle
Protection Act: (1) allowing tribal members who lawfully possess the
feathers to give them to non-tribal members who practice Native
American religion or (2) opening the Repository to all sincere
practitioners of the Native American religion. 127
Both options are feasible and demonstrate there is an alternative to
strictly prohibiting non-federally recognized tribes from possessing
eagle feathers.
The first alternative would allow non-federally
recognized tribal members to possess eagle feathers if the lawful owner
gave them the feathers. While this would allow more individuals to
possess eagle feathers, it would likely not be an expansive change
because there is currently a shortage of feathers, so tribal members who
legally own eagle feathers are unlikely to give their feathers to
individuals not in their family or tribe. Thus, this alternative achieves
the goal of protecting eagles, but still does not maintain relations with
Native American tribes, because non-federally recognized tribes are
unlikely to receive many feathers using this solution.
The second option is another workable alternative and even more
likely to achieve the governmental interests of both protecting bald and
golden eagles while also maintaining relations with Native American
tribes. This alternative suggests allowing only sincere practitioners of a
Native American faith to apply for permits. This is a better solution
because it allows for more individuals to apply for eagle permits, while
continuing to limit the number of individuals who are allowed to obtain
eagle feathers and parts to sincere practitioners of the faith.
To determine if an individual is a sincere believer of a Native
American religion, the Repository may require that certain thresholds be
met, including requirements that the individual is part of a tribe vetted
by the United States government. For example, Mr. Soto's tribe in
McAllen was over 300 years old and had a "government to government"
relationship with Texas and the United States. 128 Under the new strict
scrutiny standard employed under Hobby Lobby, tribes with an
established and sincere relationship with the United States should be
able to apply for permit-status in order to receive eagle feathers and
parts. To decrease the number of permit applications, the Repository
could require that an individual practice the religion for a number of
years or receive a letter of recommendation from the leader in his
126. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.

127. United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1290 (10th Cir. 2011).
128. McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465, 473 (5th Cir. 2014).
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congregation before being eligible to apply for a permit.
While these proposed amendments will increase the number of
applications to the Repository and could make it difficult for FWS
agents when they inspect powwows for illegal feather possession, these
setbacks are far less burdensome than preventing an individual from
practicing his or her faith. It is borderline discriminatory to reject an
individual with a sincere religious belief from exercising freedom of
religion simply because the federal government refuses to recognize his
or her religion. Furthermore, eagle feathers and parts are not an
arbitrary part of Native American religion; they are an essential and
vital component. Native Americans consider the eagle as a "sacred
messenger to the spirit world," serving essentially as a link between the
spiritual and physical worlds. 129 The eagle is used in religious
ceremonies throughout the year, including naming, marriage, burial, and
healing ceremonies. 130 One scholar argues that the United States'
Western view of religion rarely fits within the practices of the Native
American tribes, which believe that "religion is inseparable from
relationships and rituals."' 13 1 This lack of understanding is demonstrated
by the United States' long history of seeking to eliminate 'heathenish
practices' from tribal life and many religious rituals.

132

What the

Native Americans have endured in regards to the obstacles in obtaining
eagle feathers and parts arguably classifies as religious persecution that
few other religious practitioners have suffered in the United States.
Therefore, the distinction between federally and non-federally
recognized tribes should be replaced with a consideration of the
individual. Courts should instead consider whether the individual is a
sincere follower of a Native American faith instead of focusing on if an
individual is part of a federally recognized tribe.
These amendments demonstrate there is an alternative form of
regulation. Pursuant to Hobby Lobby, when an alternative form of
regulation exists, the debated law cannot be considered the least
restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest. Since two
viable alternatives exist to achieve the compelling state interests of
protecting eagles and maintaining relations with Native Americans, the
MBTA and Eagle Protection Act provisions distinguishing between
federally and non-federally recognized Native American tribes fail to
pass strict scrutiny under RFRA and therefore are unconstitutional as
applied in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits.
129. Kathryn E. Kovacs, Indian Tribes, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REv.
53, 73 (2003).
130. Id. at 74.
131. Id. at 73.
132. Id.
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B. The Necessity for a New Test to Determine How a Tribe Becomes
FederallyRecognized
In addition to Hobby Lobby making the current eagle protection
legislation unconstitutional, the federal government's requirements for a
tribe to gain federal recognition are also too burdensome and require
change.
Considering our nation's troubled history with Native
Americans, giving federal recognition to established tribes with sincere
religious beliefs is a matter of public policy. The Native American
community has long suffered under the hand of the United States
government, from the Trail of Tears to arbitrary confinement on
reservations.
Must the government further the Native American
people's suffering by taking away important instruments necessary for
the practice of their religion, a practice equivalent to the taking of a
Christian's Bible or a Muslim's Quran?
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits correctly found that allowing all Native
American tribes access to eagle feathers would place additional burdens
on members of already federally recognized tribes in the exercise of
their religion, because of increased demand for eagle feathers and
therefore, a more limited supply. 133 In light of this valid concern, it
would be overly burdensome to expand federally recognized status to all
Native American tribes. Thus, the federal government should expand
the current standard under 25 C.F.R. § 83.7, which contains the
mandatory criteria to become a federally recognized tribe.
Currently, a Native American tribe only becomes federally
recognized when it meets certain criteria, including: (1) the tribe has
been in existence since 1900, (2) the tribe acts and is perceived as a
distinct community, (3) the tribe maintains political influence or
authority, (4) the tribe must provide copies of the its membership
criteria, (5) the tribe's current membership must consist of individuals
who descend from a historical Indian tribe, (6) the tribe's membership
must be composed of persons who are not currently part of a federally
acknowledged tribe, and (7) the tribe has not terminated or forbidden a
federal relationship in the past. 134 These criteria are too strict. For
example, the Lipan Apache Tribe, which has been in existence for 300
years and is recognized by Texas, historians, and sociologists, has been
rejected multiple times since first applying for federal recognition status
in 2009.135

133. United States v. Vasquez-Ramos, 531 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1295 (10th Cir. 2011).
134. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7.
135. Kristen Mosbrucker, Eagle Feathers Returned to McAllen Tribe after 9-Year Legal Battle,
THE MONITOR (Mar. 10, 2015, 6:21 PM), http://www.themonitor.com/news/local/eagle-feathers-
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The government instead should adopt a "sincere beliefs" test. This
test would be a subjective test that considers a variety of factors,
including: (1) how long the individual applying for an eagle feather
permit has been a practitioner of a Native American faith, (2) the
regularity in which the individual attends religious ceremonies, (3) how
many individuals are members of this faith, and (4) whether the tribe or
religion has been around at least fifty years. This proposed standard is
indicative of a sincere religious belief, because the number of members
a religion has indicates legitimacy, and active participation shows
sincerity of the individual. The fifty-year requirement ensures that the
faith is both established and recognized in the community and that there
have been at least two generations of practitioners of the faith in
existence to further show legitimacy. This new standard would act as a
safeguard so that only established faiths and true practitioners are given
permits to request eagle feathers and parts.
The sincerity and fifty-year requirements will keep the number of
Repository permit applications at a manageable level, while also being
more inclusive and allowing Native Americans to enjoy religious
freedoms that other religions take for granted and are given liberally.
The current treatment of established tribes who have been around for
hundreds of years, like the Lipan Apache Tribe, is discriminatory in
comparison to the way other, more popularized religions are treated in
the United States. In light of these concerns of past discriminatory
behavior by the federal government, it is imperative that the tribal
federal recognition standard be modified to allow tribes with sincere
religious beliefs and established ties to our nation access to any
available apparatus-including eagle feathers-that is necessary to their
exercise of religion.
V. CONCLUSION

While justice was eventually granted for Robert Soto nine years after
his feathers were wrongfully confiscated, there are hundreds of sincere
believers who simply desire to practice their faith by using eagle
feathers in powwows and cannot do so because their tribe is not
federally recognized. While the interests of protecting the bald and
golden eagle are compelling, the strict standard that Native American
tribes must satisfy to obtain federal recognition in order to comply with
the MBTA and Eagle Protection Act is overly burdensome and inhibits
many Native Americans from the right to freely practice religion under
the Free Exercise Clause.

retumed-to-mcallen-tribe-after--year-legalarticle_390bfece-c77c-l 1 e4-b2cl-2370bd6608a5.html.
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Therefore, the Fifth Circuit was correct in its analysis of the MBTA
and Eagle Protection Act under the new RFRA standard as promulgated
in Hobby Lobby. The Supreme Court expanded the RFRA standard,
making the government's burden to satisfy strict scrutiny almost
impossible. Since there are clear alternatives to completely denying nonfederally recognized tribes the right to possess eagle feathers and parts,
this provision of the MIBTA and Eagle Protection Act violates RFRA
and therefore is unconstitutional. In conclusion, all circuits must adopt
the Fifth Circuit's interpretative approach of the eagle protection
legislation and the United States government must take action to reform
the current regulatory scheme and create a system that is less
cumbersome for non-federally recognized Native American tribes to
apply for eagle feather permits for religious use.
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